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1. 
Commentary on “Ethical Argumentation, Objectivity, and Bias” 
 
NEIL MEHTA 
Philosophy Department 
Yale-NUS College 
16 College Ave. West, #01-220 
Singapore, Singapore 138527 
neil.jag.mehta@gmail.com 
 
1. Summary 
 
Allen’s central question: In ethics, must partiality be unfair? His answer, in sympathy with Shafer-
Landau, Parfit, and Singer: no. And the beginnings of a theory: ethics contains a defeasible 
presumption of impartiality. 
 
2. Comments 
 
What is the relation between Allen’s answer and those of Shafer-Landau, Parfit, and Singer? Allen 
shows that according to these thinkers, partiality need not be unfair. Does he mean to move from 
there to the claim that partiality really need not be unfair, and if so how? 
Further, on Parfit’s theory, the values underpinning object-given value-based reasons are 
mind-independent. But, Allen suggests, when we decide how to act on such reasons, our evaluation 
will express our mental states and will thus be subject-given. 
Allen’s claim, though true, seems trivial. Consider any mind-independent fact p. The belief 
that p will be trivially mind-dependent. In general, the interesting question about some fact p is 
about the mind-dependence or independence of p itself, not of some mental state taking p as its 
content. So what philosophical conclusion does Allen mean to draw from this point? 
Allen also suggests that ethics contains a defeasible presumption of impartiality. But why 
think that it contains even this? It is, after all, apparently an ethical failing not to show preference 
to one’s family and friends. Maybe ethics instead just brackets one important set of partial 
considerations. 
